INTRODUCTION
Preferential arrangements (bilateral and multilateral free trade areas and GSP systems (preferences for developing countries)) are emerging everywhere in the world trading system and are causing concern because they discriminate against non-members and add complexity, distortions and inconsistency to the global system. Rules of origin (ROOs) linked to these arrangments are a significant part of the problem. More and more they have become the source in their own right of distortions in trade patterns, complexity, non-transparency and inconsistency. This essay argues that WTO members should authorize negotiations seeking to harmonize preferential ROOs (rules of origin linked to preferential arrangements) around core principles consistent with WTO rules.
The harmonized preferential ROOs should be aligned as much as possible with the harmonized regime for non-preferential ROOs (rules of origin linked to nonpreferential arrangements) likely to emerge from the current hold-over WTO negotiations authorized by the Uruguay Round ROOs Agreement. They should be nonrestrictive, based essentially on the principle that substantial transformation confers origin, and--except where developing countries benefit--should not allow cumulation (treating product components from within the preferential region as locally produced). This introduction first discusses some fundamentals about ROOs and then explains the structure of the essay.
Importing countries use ROOs to determine the national origin of imports.
Normally substantial processing must occur in the shipment country before a good would be considered to originate there. Sometimes even more than "substantial processing" is mandated. ROOs are the provisions that determine
for each product what exactly is required.
ROOs are divided into two fundamental types: preferential and nonpreferential, depending on the nature of the policy instrument to which they are linked.
1 Preferential ROOs (PROOs) are linked to trade policy instruments, such Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements or Generalized System of Preference (GSP) systems, that accord preferential market access (reduced or zero tariff rates) to imports from select countries (FTA members or developing country beneficiaries of a GSP system). Preferential ROOs determine whether a good has the national origin of a preference country, in which case it gets preferential market access.
Non-preferential ROOs (NPROOs) are linked to policy instruments of a more general nature that do not involve preferential access for goods-for example, a customs regime requiring all imports to bear a mark of origin. These policy instruments involve both neutral and also more politically sensitive purposes, though none involves offering preferential market access. Falling at the neutral--or non-political--end of the spectrum, for example, are programs for collecting trade statistics (bilateral trade balances) and, as stated, for imposing marks of origin on imports. At the politically sensitive end, there are policy instruments for restricting trade from select countries. This category includes such provisions as basic tariff laws (applicability of MFN or non-MFN tariffs), selective quotas, selective safeguard measures, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and government procurement restrictions. Except for statistical and consumer information programs, NPROOs generally decide whether a good will face restricted entry (as opposed to preferential entry)
because it comes from a country against which restrictions apply.
In today's world most traded goods contain components from, or are subject to processes in, more than one country. Some goods, however, plainly originate wholly in one country. Examples include animals raised in a single country, non-processed agricultural goods grown and harvested in a single country, and minerals extracted in a single country. For such products ROOs are uniform and non-controversial; they accord origin to that single country. In discussing ROOs this essay excludes such straightforward ROOs applicable to single-country goods and will always refer only to those ROOs applying to goods produced with the use of multiple inputs from, or processes in, two or more countries.
Support for harmonizing ROOs stems from the desire for transparency, simplicity, and reduction of transactions costs in global trade. This essay focuses primarily on harmonizing PROOs. Nevertheless, some understanding of efforts to harmonize NPROOs is essential for a discussion of PROOs, in part because the world trading system is much further along in efforts to harmonize NPROOs and has not yet even seriously considered an undertaking to harmonize
PROOs.
This essay contains four major parts. The first part, immediately below, discusses the current state of efforts to harmonize NPROOs. The second part turns to PROOs and discusses the trade distorting effects of preferential regimes, with a particular emphasis on trade distortions attributable to the PROOs themselves and not just to the underlying policy instruments to which they are linked. This discussion is important for understanding the issues that arise when one asks (as Part three does) whether certain provisions of exisiting PROOs should be avoided in harmonized rules because those provisions transgress basic WTO principles and rules. Part three, then, turns to a discussion of the relevant WTO rules that may apply to constrain or discipline PROOs. Part four discusses the current EU effort to harmonize ROOs in preferential arrangements to which the EU is a party. This is the best-known example of a serious effort to harmonize PROOs-albeit at only the regional level. The conclusion urges a harmonization effort for PROOs at the WTO level and restates the core principles around which such an effort should be structured. The goal should be clear, relatively easy to apply rules, of a non-restrictive nature, based as much as possible on the emerging harmonized NPROOs and on the fundamental notion that substantial transformation confers origin. The cumulation rule should also be eliminated, unless it benefits a developing country.
NON-PREFERENTIAL ROOs
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the only significant multilateral effort to PROOs, providing clear definitions, responding promptly to trader inquiries, and ensuring due process is followed in determinations and review procedures. The agreement's separate and minimalist treatment of PROOs presumably reflects the greater political sensitivity that surrounds these provisions.
The main goals of the ROOs Agreement are: first, to create a multilaterally agreed set of harmonized NPROOs for all products in the Harmonized System nomenclature, which ROOs would then be used for all 4 Hoekman '93 supra at 84. 5 GATT Article IX provides for MFN treatment on marks of origin, which would apply anyway, and not much else concerning ROOs.
NPROOs purposes; 6 second, to set forth the main principles that will govern application of the harmonized NPROOs once they are adopted and enter into force; 7 and third, to establish the main principles that will govern application of NPROOs during the transition period, which applies until the harmonization work is completed (presumably meaning until the harmonized rules enter into force). Several features of this harmonization effort forecast that a relatively "neutral" and non-restrictive set of harmonized ROOs is likely to emerge. As noted, the "last substantial transformation" concept is the guiding principle, and the "minimum change within the nomenclature that meets this criterion" 13 is to be chosen. Thus a country will not be authorized to use, for example, the "most significant transformation" test, which can more easily be manipulated to assign a product an origin that will trigger a quota or selective safeguard restriction.
The agreement also provides forthrightly that ROOs: "*** should not be used as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly. preferential ROOs.
13 ROO Agreement Article 9(2)(c)(ii).
14 ROO Agreement Article 9(1)(d).
15 ROO Agreement Article 9(4).
PREFERENTIAL ROOs
The two main forms of preferential arrangements for which ROOs apply are first, those resulting from regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and second, those involving unilateral (non-reciprocal) preferential access granted by industrial countries to certain goods coming from developing countries under a Generalized System of Preference (GSP) regime. Both arrangements violate the core non-discrimination principle of the WTO. FTAs are nevertheless authorized under the conditions set out in GATT Article XXIV.
GSP systems are authorized by the "Enabling Clause" adopted in a 1979 GATT entanglements of spaghetti strings in a bowl. The large number of these systems and the variety, inconsistency, and complexity of their ROOs add substantial compliance costs for traders serving multiple markets and for customs officials in those markets.
For those who see value in these arrangements, excessive compliance costs are undesirable, and harmonization of ROOs could be an attractive remedy. When multiple ROOs vary or conflict, producers and traders cannot be sure that a single production run, with a certain make-up of components and value added, will satisfy all relevant ROOs. If more than one production run is needed to satisfy different sets of ROOs, returns to scale are lost.
Of course if one opposes these discriminatory regimes in the first place, increased compliance costs might be welcomed as a desirable deterrent to their use. If the compliance costs are too high, traders will simply forego preferences and pay the MFN tariff. This is not an infrequent occurrence. Nevertheless, even for those who would prefer to dismantle discrimination in the world trading system, a harmonization project for PROOs could be seen as worthwhile.
Preferential arrangements exist, and traders must take them into account in their business plans. Hence simplification and harmonization of ROOs would still be a rational end in itself-the purpose being to improve transparency in the trading system and reduce unavoidable and wasteful compliance costs that to some extent must be incurred even for a trader to know whether it would pay to take advantage of a preference.
In the discussion below, this essay will focus primarily on the desirable content of a harmonized set of PROOs. There is currently no WTO mandate for such a harmonization program. In 1996 Japan proposed that the Committee on Rules of Origin undertake such a project for regional integration schemes because of their growing number and the distorting effects on countries outside the region. 20 Although most of the members spoke against this proposal, four countries supported it (Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, and Pakistan). 21 Once
NPROOs have been harmonized, interest in turning to PROOs may increase. In any event harmonization would improve the workings of the world trading system and certainly should be pursued as one of the ways of curtailing potential distortions from the ever larger number of preferential arrangements on the global scene.
To understand the underlying policy issues at stake, I turn first to a brief discussion of the main trade distorting features of preferential arrangements, but primarily of the ROOs linked to them. The ROOs themselves play an independent role in exacerbating the level of trade distortion involved. An understanding of the relevant distortions at stake is important, not only for understanding how harmonized ROOs of a particular content might help to correct or lessen the relevant distortions, but also for understanding how WTO provisions, namely in Article XXIV and to some extent in the Enabling Clause, might offer grounds for disciplining abusive ROOs and perhaps encourage harmonization centered around curtailing distortions.
Trade Diversion and Preferential ROOs
The wisdom of allowing FTA and GSP derogations from the core nondiscrimination principle (MFN) of the GATT/WTO system is controversial. As is frequently discussed in trade writings, preferential access for a final good in an FTA or a GSP system will trigger both trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs--and is efficiency enhancing--where a leastcost-producer, found within the preferential area, gains increased market access through the elimination of tariffs. Trade diversion occurs-and is distortivewhere the least-cost producer is found outside the preferential area and is displaced within the preference area by a less efficient preference-receiving producer who is freed of the tariffs that the non-member, least-cost producer must face.
Trade diversion is undesirable (because it is inefficient), but those who approve of preferences deem trade diversion an acceptable cost because of the overall benefits deriving from the regime. In the case of FTAs, claimed benefits come from trade creation and other aspects of market integration and political cooperation. In the case of GSP systems, they come from trade creation and, more importantly, from the claimed assistance they offer developing countries in meeting their development goals.
We have been discussing the positive and negative effects of preferential arrangements without distinguishing between final and intermediate products. At the most liberal end-the complete absence of ROOs--transshipment through a preference country would be allowed and there would again be little or no trade diversion. A least-cost producer in a non-preferred country could gain preferential access merely by transshipping through a preference country.
Economists refer to such transshipment as "trade deflection." But here again the purposes of the preference regime would be defeated. Benefits intended for preference countries would be reaped instead by non-preference countries via trade deflection. If just one preference country did not produce the good in 24 I am indebted to Aaditya Mattoo at the World Bank for this observation.
25 Non-processed goods that are sourced in a single country, such as minerals, animals raised on a farm or unprocessed agricultural goods, would of course qualify. For such goods, however, ROOs are irrelevant, because their origin will be clear under any conceivable set of ROOs. One exception would be fish, where origin could be attributed either to the nationality of the waters where they are caught or to that of the fishing vessels that do the catching. ROOs somewhere between the extremes of maximum restrictiveness and maximum liberality are therefore needed to achieve the purposes of preferential regimes. In that middle range some amount of trade diversion in final products is inevitable-the existence of the preference assures that this will be so. In the case of an FTA, the Article XXIV(8)(b) rule requiring that free trade be achieved with respect to "substantially all trade" seems likely to prevent bilateral or regional agreements aimed primarily at trade diversion. 26 If it were not for that requirement one might expect to see many FTAs spring up limited to a few carefully selected final products-where the beneficiaries of trade diversion on both sides of a border would prosper at the expense of more efficient third-country competitors. Thus, if the "substantially all trade" discipline is effectively enforced, it will operate to reduce the element of trade diversion in final products, though some trade diversion will still occur.
In the case of GSP systems, the essential discipline derives from the requirement that these regimes be designed to assist developing countries. This will not reduce trade diversion, but at least the inevitable trade diversion will benefit export-oriented producers in the developing countries. GATT Articles XXIV and III(4).
The upshot of this analysis and the discussion to follow is to favor a formula for harmonized PROOs that would prohibit component cumulation and hold the restrictiveness of preferential ROOs to the lower middle range. This would serve to limit some of the trade diverting effects associated with PROOs themselves, while still preventing trade deflection and ensuring that a genuine "substantial transformation" occurs in the country of origin before a local good could benefit from a regional preference.
I turn below to a fuller discussion of the ways in which existing WTO rules may apply to discipline preferential ROOs. As mentioned, I will argue that in the case of FTA agreements these rules should be seen to prohibit both component cumulation and excessively restrictive ROOs. In the case of GSP systems, I believe WTO rules have less significance for ROOs, but they still should be seen to prohibit bilateral cumulation-to be explained below. regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area * * *" (Emphasis added)
Thus, Article XXIV(5)(b) contemplates that members of an FTA will each retain the external tariff and other barriers (which may not be increased) that prevailed prior to forming the FTA. The need for ROOs derives from this feature of FTAs-the continued existence in each FTA member state of its own (non-harmonized) tariff and quota regime applicable to third countries. In a customs union the external tariff is harmonized. Thus, any product shipped from one member country to another can be accepted duty-free, because that product and its components would have faced the same tariff levels and other restrictions, irrespective of the port of entry. But in an FTA, only products that have undergone some level of processing in the member country from which they are shipped will be given duty-free treatment. Otherwise, third countries will simply transship through the country with the lowest external tariff, and the FTA will be converted into a de facto customs union with an applicable external tariff equal to the lowest tariff rate prevailing among the members.
In the second edition of their well-known book on the world trading system, Trebilcock and Howse proposed that Article XXIV (5) and importing FTA members) that would apply on all third-country components-as long as the importing FTA member's rate were higher. Such a scheme could be interpreted to meet the requirements of Article XXIV (8)(b) ("duties * * * are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories") if "products originating in such territories" were interpreted to mean "products, or components (including value added) originating in such territories." Thus, nonoriginating components could be subjected to an equalizing tariff. Government documents openly acknowledge that preferential ROOs are instruments of commercial policy. 40 Hence it should follow that they constitute "other regulations of commerce" in the sense of Article XXIV (5) WTO provisions come into play. 39 In the case of a customs union the equivalent provision of XXIV (5)(a) says that duties and other regulations of commerce shall not "on the whole be higher * * *." This is because for a customs union some external barriers must be raised while others must be lowered to form a common external commercial policy against third parties In the case of an FTA, however, there is no justification for any increase in an external barrier against third country trade. "The products of * * * any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale * * *" (Emphasis added)
ROOs going beyond what would be needed to prevent trade deflectionfor eample, ROOs more restrictive than needed to capture "substantial transformation"-would seem to run afoul of Article III(4)-at least if the ROOs were so restrictive that they could only be met with the use of local components (as opposed to other forms of local value added processing). 41 In that situation, partner FTA components would be treated less favorably than local components. Of course allowing component cumulation would eliminate 41 The AB analyzed a closely analogous issue in Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS 139 & 142/AB/R (2000). There the question was whether the Canadian scheme of tariff preferences operated as a prohibited import substitution subsidy under Article 3.1(b) (prohibiting a subsidy contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods). The AB concluded that a violation could be found if the value-added requirement of the Canadian scheme were so demanding that it could only be met through the use of domestic components, as opposed to other aspects of value added, such as local labor costs in processing. (4)) would not seem to be excused in the light of the Turkish Textiles interpretation of Article XXIV (4) and (5), because it would not be necessary to the formation of the FTA. 43 Intermediate good producers, on the other hand, would prefer ROOs sufficiently restrictive to eliminate competitors, but not so restrictive as to prevent the final product from gaining preferential access. 44 Of course this same Article XXIV (8) GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203, para. 2(c) . One might note that the term here is "less-developed" and not "developing". The Enabling Clause distinguishes between developing and least-developed countries, but it appears to use the term "less-developed" as interchangeable with "developing".
GSP Systems
In the case of GSP systems it is again the Enabling Clause, and not Article It might be argued that bilateral cumulation also assists developing countries, because it allows them more flexibility in satisfying the origin rule, which, if it is not satisfied, would deny the preference. However, an alternative that does not clash with the Enabling Clause exits. A preference granting country could drop bilateral cumulation and at the same time relax the restrictiveness of the applicable ROOs so that an equivalent amount of trade from developing countries would qualify for preferential treatment. One way to do so would be to liberalize the ROOs in a general way (e.g., reduce the required local value added percentage). Another would be to adopt or expand "tolerance rules" under which a certain amount of non-originating materials would be treated as local, no matter where they actually originated. This would increase the flow of goods able to take advantage of the preference, without privileging grantor-country intermediate products.
CURRENT EFFORTS AT HARMONIZING PROOs (THE INITIATIVE WITHIN THE EU)
As noted earlier, efforts to launch a harmonization initiative for PROOs at the WTO level have so far failed. Within the EU, however, considerable attention is being devoted to the benefits of harmonizing the EU's own PROOs. 53 The EU's current approach to preferential ROOs is dramatically nonuniform. The EU has about 40 different preferential arrangements in place (GSP and FTA systems) 54 and almost as many different sets of ROOs, generally countries. 58 The harmonized ROOs are also intended for FTA agreements, 59 presumably for future such agreements or where existing agreements can be renegotiated.
The Commission favors an across the board value added system. Origin would be conferred if local (or cumulated regional) value added exceeds a certain stated percentage of net production cost (NPC). NPC would include the cost of components and production costs directly attributable to output (such as labor, energy, plant and equipment) but would exclude overhead and related costs not directly attributable to production (such as marketing, administrative costs, and profit mark-up). 60 The Commission claims that the instability introduced by exchange rate and price changes can be dealt with through an averaging system and that administrative costs should not be excessive because producers regularly keep track of production costs for many purposes, including pricing. 61 There are of course other disadvantages to a VA system, such as the lack of an incentive to keep local production costs down and the bias against countries with low labor costs. However, other systems also have their drawbacks.
A major disadvantage of this initiative, however, is that it clashes with the multilateral NPROOs system being negotiated in Geneva under the ROOs Agreement. As discussed in the opening section of this essay, the multilateral NPROOs system under negotiation will rely primarily on a CTH approach, supplemented on certain tariff lines by value-added and special-processing rules.
If PROOs and NPROOs go their separate ways, overall harmonization in the future will be made more difficult. Although the Commission considers joining the two major types of ROOs to be a "false good idea," 62 the analysis presented above disagrees with that conclusion.
CONCLUSION
This essay has argued for the importance of launching an effort at the WTO level to harmonize PROOs. Such an undertaking is not likely to be taken seriously, however, until after the WTO members successfully negotiate a harmonized set of NPROOs, which at this writing is long overdue. I have argued further that harmonized NPROOs-which are expected to be relatively non-restrictive and neutral, based on the concept of "last substantial transformation"-would provide a good model for a harmonized set of PROOs.
In particular I have claimed that existing WTO rules, namely Article XXIV (4) are non-restrictive and that do not allow component cumulation (or in the and their accompanying ROOs is to move as aggressively as possible to lower MFN tariffs worldwide. As these come down, so will the distortions associated with preferences. On the pragmatic assumption, however, that such a first-best world will be long in coming, it still seems important to pursue harmonization of PROOs.
